What makes Locke's simple ideas adequate?

In a recent paper, José Luis Bermúdez argues that Locke's claim that all simple ideas are adequate is inconsistent with other claims he makes in the Essay concerning the nature of such ideas. In particular, Bermúdez argues that Locke is unjustified in claiming that all simple ideas are adequate, because simple ideas of secondary qualities are in fact not. In this paper I argue that Bermúdez has missed an essential aspect of Locke's distinction and has therefore misconstrued his claims.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,631
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

34 ( #127,522 of 1,938,800 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #458,338 of 1,938,800 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.