What makes Locke's simple ideas adequate?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In a recent paper, José Luis Bermúdez argues that Locke's claim that all simple ideas are adequate is inconsistent with other claims he makes in the Essay concerning the nature of such ideas. In particular, Bermúdez argues that Locke is unjustified in claiming that all simple ideas are adequate, because simple ideas of secondary qualities are in fact not. In this paper I argue that Bermúdez has missed an essential aspect of Locke's distinction and has therefore misconstrued his claims.
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