Optimum Inductive Methods. A study in Inductive Probability, Bayesian Statistics, and Verisimilitude
| Abstract | According to the Bayesian view, scientific hypotheses must be appraised in terms of their posterior probabilities relative to the available experimental data. Such posterior probabilities are derived from the prior probabilities of the hypotheses by applying Bayes'theorem. One of the most important problems arising within the Bayesian approach to scientific methodology is the choice of prior probabilities. Here this problem is considered in detail w.r.t. two applications of the Bayesian approach: (1) the theory of inductive probabilities (TIP) developed by Rudolf Carnap and other epistomologists and (2) the analysis of the multinational inferences provided by Bayesian statstics (BS). ... Zie: Summary. | |||||||||
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James Joyce, Bayes' Theorem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Cory F. Juhl (1996). Objectively Reliable Subjective Probabilities. Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.
Samir Okasha (2003). Probabilistic Induction and Hume's Problem: Reply to Lange. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.
Patrick Maher (2010). Bayesian Probability. Synthese 172 (1).
Michael Strevens (2004). Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework? Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.
Joachim Hornung (1980). Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.
Cory Juhl (1993). Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
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