Qualia: Irreducibly subjective but not intrinsic

Abstract
The indirect realist theory of our knowledge of the external world which Russellian philosophers of mind have appealed to in formulating and defending a unique version of the mind-brain identity theory can be applied also to the formulation and defence of a unique version of functionalism. On the view that results, qualia turn out to be features which do not exist over and above the natural world , and are irreducibly subjective but are non-intrinsic properties of brain states . This view, which can be called ‘Hayekian functionalism’ , thus shows how we can combine the best insights of functionalism with the respect for the subjectivity of qualia which critics of functionalism claim it cannot accommodate
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Qualia  Subjectivity  Russell
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