Connectionism and cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn are wrong
In A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.), Connectionism in Context. Springer-Verlag (1992)
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|Keywords||Cognitivism Compositionality Connectionism Epistemology Fodor, J Pylyshyn, Z|
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