David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 7 (3):345-364 (1997)
Cognitive science has been dominated by the computational conception that cognition is computation across representations. To the extent to which cognition as computation across representations is supposed to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic, problem-solving activity, however, computers appear to be incapable of cognition. They are devices that can facilitate computations on the basis of semantic grounding relations as special kinds of signs. Even their algorithmic, problem-solving character arises from their interpretation by human users. Strictly speaking, computers as such — apart from human users — are not only incapable of cognition, but even incapable of computation, properly construed. If we want to understand the nature of thought, then we have to study thinking, not computing, because they are not the same thing
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Computer Mind Science Sign|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
João Queiroz & Floyd Merrell (2009). On Peirce's Pragmatic Notion of Semiosis—a Contribution for the Design of Meaning Machines. Minds and Machines 19 (1):129-143.
Antônio Gomes, Ricardo Gudwin, Charbel Niño El-Hani & João Queiroz (2007). Towards the Emergence of Meaning Processes in Computers From Peircean Semiotics. Mind and Society 6 (2):173-187.
Similar books and articles
Bruce J. MacLennan (1994). Words Lie in Our Way. Minds and Machines 4 (4):421-37.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1989). Computing and Cognitive Science. In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Stevan Harnad (1994). Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't. Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
Andrew Brook (2008). Phenomenology: Contribution to Cognitive Science. Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE II, Pp. 54 – 70, 2008 (3):54-70.
Mark Sprevak (2010). Computation and Cognitive Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):223-226.
James H. Fetzer (2000). Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 103-113.
Tim van Gelder (1998). Computers and Computation in Cognitive Science. In T.M. Michalewicz (ed.), Advances in Computational Life Sciences Vol.2: Humans to Proteins. Melbourne: CSIRO Publishing.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #76,845 of 1,098,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #287,052 of 1,098,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?