Epistemology without metaphysics

Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290 (2009)
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on "ground level" epistemology.
Keywords Expressivism  Relativism  Norms  Epistemic realism  Justification  Truth
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DOI 10.2307/27734403
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Sinan Dogramaci (2012). Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.

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