David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290 (2009)
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on "ground level" epistemology.
|Keywords||Expressivism Relativism Norms Epistemic realism Justification Truth|
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
Sinan Dogramaci (2012). Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
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