Pluralism in logic

Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359 (2009)
There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are initially inclined to understand debates about logic. Can one find a pluralist thesis that is high on the interest scale, and also true?
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020309090182
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References found in this work BETA
George Boolos (1985). Nominalist Platonism. Philosophical Review 94 (3):327-344.
Hilary Putnam (1968). Is Logic Empirical? Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5.

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