Quine and the correspondence theory

Philosophical Review 83 (2):200-228 (1974)
Abstract
A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should abandon the relation and replace it by certain more general correspondence relations between words and extralinguistic objects. Doing so will not interfere with the task of defining truth in terms of correspondence relations
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    V. Mc Gee (2005). Two Conceptions of Truth? – Comment. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.
    J. Robert G. Williams (2011). Degree Supervaluational Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):130-149.
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