Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27 (2002)
|Abstract||The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr(A)A (understood as the conjunction of Tr(A)A and ATr(A)). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(A)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an . Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with as an additional connective, and where the effect of classical logic is preserved in the arithmetic or formal syntax itself. Section 1 is an introduction to the problem and some of the difficulties that must be faced, in particular as to the logic of the ; Section 2 gives a construction of an arithmetically standard model of a truth theory; Section 3 investigates the logical laws that result from this; and Section 4 provides some philosophical commentary.|
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