|Abstract||Naive truth theory is, roughly, the theory of truth that in classical logic leads to well-known paradoxes (such as the Liar paradox and the Curry paradox). One response to these paradoxes is to weaken classical logic by restricting the law of excluded middle and introducing a conditional not defined from the other connectives in the usual way. In "New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory" (), Steve Yablo develops a new version of this response, and cites three respects in which he deems it superior to a version that I’ve advocated in several papers. I think he’s right that my version was non-optimal in some of these respects (one and a half of them, to be precise); however, Yablo’s own account seems to me to have some undesirable features as well. In this paper I will explore some variations on his account, and end up tentatively advocating a synthesis of his account and mine (one that is somewhat closer to mine than to his).|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Michael Glanzberg (2003). Minimalism and Paradoxes. Synthese 135 (1):13 - 36.
Gary Mar & Paul St Denis (1999). What the Liar Taught Achilles. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.
Jeffrey Ketland (2005). Yablo's Paradox and Ω-Inconsistency. Synthese 145 (3):295 - 302.
P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.
Laurence Goldstein (2006). Fibonacci, Yablo, and the Cassationist Approach to Paradox. Mind 115 (460):867-890.
O. Bueno & M. Colyvan (2003). Yablo's Paradox and Referring to Infinite Objects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):402 – 412.
Roy A. Sorensen (1998). Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars. Mind 107 (425):137-155.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #34,173 of 549,124 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,740 of 549,124 )
How can I increase my downloads?