Vagueness, partial belief, and logic
| Abstract | Discussion of Chapter 5 of Stephen Schiffer's "The Things We Mean' in which Stephen Schiffer advances two novel theses: 1. Vagueness (and indeterminacy more generally) is a psychological phenomenon; 2. It is indeterminate whether classical logic applies in situations where vagueness matters. | |||||||||
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