Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):691-718 (2008)
I separate two intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions that are often conflated: one between properties (the intrinsic/extrinsic, or I/E, distinction) and one between the ways in which properties are had by individuals (the intrinsically/extrinsically, or I-ly/E-ly, distinction). I propose an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E distinction that explains, inter alia, the puzzle of cross-classification: how it can be, for example, that the property of being square can be classified as an intrinsic property and yet individuals can be square intrinsically or else extrinsically
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DOI 10.5840/jphil20081051121
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PhilPapers Archive Carrie Figdor, Intrinsically/Extrinsically
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