David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456 (2010)
Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English‐Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e‐mail: carrie‐firstname.lastname@example.org.
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Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver (2011). Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches. [REVIEW] Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
Carrie Figdor (2011). Semantics and Metaphysics in Informatics: Toward an Ontology of Tasks (a Reply to Lenartowicz Et Al. 2010, Towards an Ontology of Cognitive Control). Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):222-226.
Mark Bauer (2013). Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.
Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon (2011). What's on Your Mind? A Brain Scan Won't Tell. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):699-722.
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