The neutrality of rightness and the indexicality of goodness: Beyond objectivity and back again

Ratio 21 (3):273-285 (2008)
Abstract
My purpose in the present paper is two-fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The 'objectively right' course of action must be right, 'neutrally' speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision-making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.
Keywords rightness  virtue  objective viewpoint  subjectively normative
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,018
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Jason Kawall (2009). In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-21.
Edward L. Krasevac (2003). Goodness and Rightness Ten Years Later. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):535-548.
Gerald Lang (2004). A Dilemma for Objective Act-Utilitarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):221-239.
Holly M. Smith (2010). Subjective Rightness. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.
Alastair Norcross (1997). Good and Bad Actions. Philosophical Review 106 (1):1-34.
Matt Stichter (2011). Virtues, Skills, and Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):73-86.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

103 ( #10,478 of 1,101,120 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #290,780 of 1,101,120 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.