David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis (4):1-33 (2014)
The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence
|Keywords||rationality requirements constitutive accounts necessary conditions normative reasons|
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References found in this work BETA
John Broome (2007). Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
John Broome (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.
John Broome, Requirements. Hommage à Wlodek; 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.
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