A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'

Erkenntnis (4):1-33 (2014)
Abstract
The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence
Keywords rationality  requirements  constitutive accounts  necessary conditions  normative reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9591-8
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bruno Guindon (2016). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
Julian Fink (2016). The Ladder of Rationality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.

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