A difficulty for the possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals

Synthese 189 (1):29-57 (2012)
I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents
Keywords Counterfactuals  Possible worlds  Similarity  Substitution  Intensionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0094-y
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (2012). Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds. Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):221-246.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. Americal Philosophical Quarterly:98-112.

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Citations of this work BETA
William B. Starr (2014). A Uniform Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.

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Similar books and articles
Kit Fine (2012). Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds. Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):221-246.
Barak Krakauer (2012). Counterpossibles. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
Michael McDermott (2003). Closeness of Worlds. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):227-230.

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