David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 27 (4):391-404 (1960)
Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power of a new observation to reduce uncertainty toward the ideal amount, zero; all these powers are systematically shown to be exact metrical functions of Pr(H) and Pr(o/H)/Pr(o)-1 where the numerator is the likelihood of the new observation given H, and the denominator is the "expectedness" of the observation
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Brian Pitts (2013). Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
Similar books and articles
Siu L. Chow (1995). In Defense of Experimental Data in a Relativistic Milieu. Philosophical Explorations.
Alan Baker (2003). Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.
David Gooding (1986). How Do Scientists Reach Agreement About Novel Observations? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (2):205-230.
Clark Glymour (1975). Relevant Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):403-426.
Robert Nola (1990). Some Observations on a Popperian Experiment Concerning Observation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 21 (2):329-346.
Joseph Y. Halpern & Riccardo Pucella (2009). Evidence with Uncertain Likelihoods. Synthese 171 (1):111 - 133.
John D. Greenwood (1990). Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The "Theory-Informity" of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):553-574.
Henry A. Finch (1960). Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #386,730 of 1,413,475 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #155,015 of 1,413,475 )
How can I increase my downloads?