Essence and modality

It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion. The one notion is, if I am right, a highly refined version of the other; it is like a sieve which performs a similar function but with a much finer mesh.
Keywords essence modality necessity
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DOI 10.2307/2214160
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Uriah Kriegel (2015). Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):153-180.

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