EEG oscillatory states as neuro-phenomenology of consciousness as revealed from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi
Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169 (2012)
The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively related to the level of consciousness expression in brain-damaged patients and healthy-conscious subjects. Specifically, results demonstrated that (a) decreased number of EEG microstate types was associated with altered states of consciousness, (b) unawareness was associated with the lack of diversity in EEG alpha-rhythmic microstates, and (c) the probability for the occurrence and duration of delta-, theta- and slow-alpha-rhythmic microstates were associated with unawareness, whereas the probability for the occurrence and duration of fast-alpha-rhythmic microstates were associated with consciousness. In conclusion, resting EEG has a potential value in revealing NCC. This work may have implications for clinical care and medical–legal decisions in patients with disorders of consciousness.
|Keywords||Electroencephalogram (EEG) Disorder of consciousness EEG oscillations Brain microstates Awareness Minimally conscious state (MCS) Vegetative state (VS) Spectral patterns Traumatic brain injury unresponsive state|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2014). Do We Need a Theory-Based Assessment of Consciousness in the Field of Disorders of Consciousness? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:402.
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