Inquiry in the Meno
In R. Kraut (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge University Press (1992)
| Abstract | In most of the Socratic dialogues, Socrates professes to inquire into some virtue. At the same time, he professes not to know what the virtue in question is. How, then, can he inquire into it? Doesn't he need some knowledge to guide his inquiry? Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge seems to preclude Socratic inquiry. This difficulty must confront any reader of the Socratic dialogues; but one searches them in vain for any explicit statement of the problem or for any explicit solution to it. The Meno, by contrast, both raises it explicitly and proposes a solution. | |||||||||
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Roslyn Weiss (2001). Virtue in the Cave: Moral Inquiry in Plato's Meno. Oxford University Press.
Matthew King (2007). The Meno's Metaphilosophical Examples. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):395-412.
Mary Louise Gill (2003). A More Socratic Meno R. Weiss: Virtue in the Cave. Moral Inquiry in Plato's Meno. Pp. X + 229. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Cased, £35. Isbn: 0-19-514076-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 53 (02):299-.
Peter Warnek (2003). Teiresias in Athens. Epoché 7 (2):261-289.
Trent Dougherty (2011). Knowledge Happens: Why Zagzebski has Not Solved the Meno Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88.
Gareth Matthews (2009). Whatever Became of the Socratic Elenchus? Philosophical Analysis in Plato. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):439-450.
W. J. (1998). Plato and the "Socratic Fallacy". Phronesis 43 (2):97-113.
William Prior (1998). Plato and the "Socratic Fallacy". Phronesis 43 (2):97-113.
Shigeru Yonezawa (2012). Socratic Courage in Plato's Socratic Dialogues. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (4):645 - 665.
Lee Franklin (2009). Meno's Paradox, the Slave-Boy Interrogation, and the Unity of Platonic Recollection. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):349-377.
Marlene Benjamin (1992). Socrates, Meno, and Daedalus. Philosophical Inquiry 14 (1-2):24-38.
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