David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethics 121 (1):7-36 (2010)
We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism; we argue for a parallel solution.
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Citations of this work BETA
John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (forthcoming). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2013). Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity. Inquiry 56 (2-3):149-178.
Alex Worsnip (2015). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). 'Ought' and Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
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