Review of John F. Horty, Reasons as Defaults [Book Review]

Philosophical Review 124 (2):286-289 (2015)
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Abstract

Review of J.F. Horty, REASONS AS DEFAULTS.

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10.1215/00318108-2845832

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Stephen Finlay
Australian Catholic University

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