Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- Kit Fine (2002). The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford University Press.Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits of Abstraction breaks new ground both technically and philosophically.
Discussion of Kit Fine, The Limits of Abstraction
Nothing in this forum yet.
Similar books and articles
Book Information The Limits of Abstraction. The Limits of Abstraction Kit Fine , Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2002 , x + 203 , £18.99 (cloth). By Kit Fine. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 203. £18.99 (cloth).
Co-authored discussion note on Kit Fine's "Limits of Abstraction" with special focus on the more philosophical aspects of the book (chapter one and two).
No categories
We characterize abstraction in computer science by first comparing the fundamental nature of computer science with that of its cousin mathematics. We consider their primary products, use of formalism, and abstraction objectives, and find that the two disciplines are sharply distinguished. Mathematics, being primarily concerned with developing inference structures, has information neglect as its abstraction objective. Computer science, being primarily concerned with developing interaction patterns, has information hiding as its abstraction objective. We show that abstraction through information hiding is a (...)
No categories
The neo-Fregean project of basing mathematics on abstraction principles faces “the bad company problem,” namely that a great variety of unacceptable abstraction principles are mixed in among the acceptable ones. In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem, based on the idea that individuation must take the form of a well-founded process. A surprising aspect of this solution is that every form of abstraction on concepts is permissible and that paradox is instead avoided by restricting what concepts (...)
I present a general theory of abstraction operators which treats them as variable-binding term- forming operators, and provides a reasonably uniform treatment for definite descriptions, set abstracts, natural number abstraction, and real number abstraction. This minimizing, extensional and relational theory reveals a striking similarity between definite descriptions and set abstracts, and provides a clear rationale for the claim that there is a logic of sets (which is ontologically non- committal). The theory also treats both natural and real numbers as answering (...)
No categories
No categories
In this paper, we offer a Piagetian perspective on the construction of the logico-mathematical schemas which embody our knowledge of logic and mathematics. Logico-mathematical entities are tied to the subject's activities, yet are so constructed by reflective abstraction that they result from sensorimotor experience only via the construction of intermediate schemas of increasing abstraction. The axiom set does not exhaust the cognitive structure (schema network) which the mathematician thus acquires. We thus view truth not as something to be defined within (...)
No categories
Neo-Fregean logicism seeks to base mathematics on abstraction principles. But the acceptable abstraction principles are surrounded by unacceptable (indeed often paradoxical) ones. This is the “bad company problem.” In this introduction I first provide a brief historical overview of the problem. Then I outline the main responses that are currently being debated. In the course of doing so I provide summaries of the contributions to this special issue.


