David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 112 (446):195-234 (2003)
There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for the functioning of our language and that the original argument should therefore be allowed to stand.
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Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Multiple Location Defended. Philosophical Studies.
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Noël B. Saenz (2015). A Grounding Solution to the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2193-2214.
L. A. Paul (2006). Coincidence as Overlap. Noûs 40 (4):623–659.
Nicholas Stang (2013). The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves. Noûs 47 (4):106-136.
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