David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30 (2001)
This paper distinguishes two kinds of realist issue -- the issue of whether the propositions of a given domain are factual and the issue of whether they are fundamental. It criticizes previous accounts of what these issues come to and suggests that they are to be understood in terms of a basic metaphysical concept of reality. This leaves open the question of how such issues are to be resolved; and it is argued that this may be done through consideration of what grounds the facts of a given domain, when fundamentality is in question, and what grounds our engagement with the putative facts, when factuality is in question
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Citations of this work BETA
Gideon Rosen (2015). Real Definition. Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.
Jessica M. Wilson (2014). No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry 57 (5-6):535–579.
Alexander Skiles (2015). Against Grounding Necessitarianism. Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751.
Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Fundamentality and Ontological Minimality. In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press
Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
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