The question of realism

Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30 (2001)
This paper distinguishes two kinds of realist issue -- the issue of whether the propositions of a given domain are factual and the issue of whether they are fundamental. It criticizes previous accounts of what these issues come to and suggests that they are to be understood in terms of a basic metaphysical concept of reality. This leaves open the question of how such issues are to be resolved; and it is argued that this may be done through consideration of what grounds the facts of a given domain, when fundamentality is in question, and what grounds our engagement with the putative facts, when factuality is in question.
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Chad Carmichael (2015). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.

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