David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):125–133 (2011)
David Shoemaker argues from (A) psychopaths’ emotional deficiency, to (B) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (C) their lack of criminal responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in this argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths’ emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgements. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. An alternative perspective on psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is proposed.
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.
R. J. R. Blair (1995). A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition 57 (1):1-29.
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