What ought probably means, and why you can't detach it

Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89 (2010)
Abstract
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for 'ought' provides a more satisfactory solution
Keywords Semantics of ought  Detaching problem  Normativity  Deontic modals  Instrumental principle
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John Broome (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
John Broome (2002). Practical Reasoning. In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press. 85--111.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1964). The Ethics of Requirement. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):147 - 153.

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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Chrisman (2012). 'Ought' and Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
Daan Evers (2013). Weight for Stephen Finlay. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):737-749.
Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2014). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.

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