Austin and the argument from illusion

Philosophical Review 73 (July):372-382 (1964)
Firth argues that austin's criticisms of the argument from illusion do not destroy the argument. We can reformulate it in two ways so that it succeeds as a method of ostensibly defining terms denoting the sensory constituent of perceptual experience. One way maintains the act-Object distinction of the cartesian tradition and the other uses the language of "looks." (staff)
Keywords Epistemology  Illusion  Judgment  Ostensive Definition  Perception  Seeing  Sensation  Sense Data  Austin
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