Arguing About Metaethics

Routledge (2006)
Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don't exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgment and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgments, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism. The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the twelve themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level.
Keywords Ethics
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Call number BJ1012.F537 2006
ISBN(s) 0415380278   9780415380270   0415380286   9780415380287   9780203759097
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Wim de Muijnck (2011). Valuation by Behaviour. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):141-155.

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