Disjunctivism

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009)
Abstract
Disjunctivism, as a theory of visual experience, claims that the mental states involved in a “good case” experience of veridical perception and a “bad case” experience of hallucination differ, even in those cases in which the two experiences are indistinguishable for their subject. Consider the veridical perception of a bar stool and an indistinguishable hallucination; both of these experiences might be classed together as experiences (as) of a bar stool or experiences of seeming to see a bar stool. This might lead us to think that the experiences we undergo in the two cases must be of the same kind, the difference being that the former, but not the latter, is connected to the world in the right kind of way. Such a conjecture has been called a “highest common factor” or “common kind” assumption. At heart, disjunctivism consists in the rejection of this assumption. According the disjunctivist, veridical experiences and hallucinations do not share a common component. There are a host of interesting questions surrounding disjunctivism including: What is involved in the claims that good case and bad case experiences differ? Why might one might want to be a disjunctivist? What kinds of claims can the disjunctivist make about hallucination and illusion? These questions, and problems for the thesis, will be discussed as we proceed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Manuel Liz (2008). Substantive, a Posteriori, Type Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:165-170.
    Jesús Vega-Encabo (2010). Hallucinations for Disjunctivists. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):281-293.
    Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 205--224.
    Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Ram Neta (2008). In Defense of Disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 311--29.
    Huaping Wang (2011). Disjunctivism and Skepticism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.
    Bosuk Yoon (2008). What is the Subjectivity of Perceptual Experience? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:215-222.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-12-22

    Total downloads

    40 ( #35,958 of 1,089,062 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    4 ( #24,247 of 1,089,062 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.