David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Investigations 24 (4):330-346 (2001)
It is no surprise that empirical psychology refutes, again and again, assumptions of uneducated common sense. But some puzzlement tends to arise when scientific results appear to call into question the very conceptual framework of the mental to which we have become accustomed. This paper shall examine a case in point: Experiments on colour-discrimination have recently been taken to refute an assumption of first-person authority that appears to be constitutive of our ordinary notion of perceptual experience. The paper is to show that those experiments do not refute this assumption, and will suggest that the impression to the contrary is, ultimately, due to two factors: to misleading imagery and, above all, to mistaken translation from the technical idiom of empirical psychology into the plain English we use every day. This is to take the mystery out of what we shall see to constitute a pretty puzzle; it is to remind us just how careful we need to be when drawing conclusions from results of scientific psychology; and it is to bring out the virtues of methods commonly lumped together under the entirely misleading label of 'ordinary language philosophy', of methods far more useful than their common caricature would make one think.
|Keywords||Authority Color Discrimination Epistemology Perception|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gary Hatfield (1992). Color Perception and Neural Encoding: Does Metameric Matching Entail a Loss of Information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992:492-504.
Mohan P. Matthen (1999). The Disunity of Color. Philosophical Review 108 (1):47-84.
Peter W. Ross (1997). Trichromacy and the Neural Basis of Color Discrimination. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):206-207.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Kasper Lippert-rasmussen (2006). The Badness of Discrimination. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):167 - 185.
Luca Ferrero (2003). An Elusive Challenge to the Authorship Account: Commentary on Lawlor's "Elusive Reasons". Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):565 – 577.
Gary D. Fisk & Steven J. Haase (2005). Unconscious Perception or Not? An Evaluation of Detection and Discrimination as Indicators of Awareness. American Journal of Psychology 118 (2):183-212.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #137,616 of 1,139,970 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #64,319 of 1,139,970 )
How can I increase my downloads?