Does simulation theory really involve simulation?

Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432 (2006)
This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is a particular way of using one process to acquire knowledge about another process. What distinguishes simulation from other ways of acquiring knowledge is that simulation requires, for its non-accidental success, that the simulating process reflect significant aspects of the simulated process. This conceptual work is of independent philosophical interest, but it also enables me to argue for two conclusions that are of great significance to the debate about mental simulation theory. First, I argue that, in order to stake a non-trivial claim, simulation theory must hold that mental simulation involves what I call concretely similar processes. Second, I argue for the surprising conclusion that a significant class of cases that simulation theorists have claimed as intuitive cases of simulation do not actually involve simulation, after all. I close by sketching an alternative account that might handle these problematic cases.
Keywords Folk Psychology  Mental States  Mind  Simulation  Scaccia, M
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600726377
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References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.
David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.

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