Freedom and miracles

Noûs 22 (2):235-252 (1988)
The modal argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise is discussed. It is argued that there is no interpretation of the argument on which it is uncontroversially sound. That is, there are some important gaps in the argument, and it is illuminating to see precisely where these gaps are. The criticism of the modal argument is defended against certain examples offered by Ginet and van Inwagen.
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DOI 10.2307/2215861
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