Four Views on Free Will

Blackwell Pub. (2007)
Abstract
Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Keywords Free will and determinism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $85.74 new (25% off)   $91.23 direct from Amazon (23% off)   $120.60 used    Amazon page
Call number BJ1461.F68 2007
ISBN(s) 1405134852   9781405134859   9781405134866
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    Chapters BETA
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Derk Pereboom (2009). Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.

    View all 23 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    145 ( #4,238 of 1,089,156 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,781 of 1,089,156 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.