Four Views on Free Will

Blackwell Pub. (2007)
Abstract Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series
Keywords Free will and determinism
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Call number BJ1461.F68 2007
ISBN(s) 1405134852   9781405134859
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    Similar books and articles
    Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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    Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.

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