Libertarianism and Avoid Ability

Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):119-125 (1995)
In previous work, I have claimed that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities work even in a world in which the actual sequence proceeds in a manner congenial to the libertarian. In “Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions,” Widerker criticizes this claim. Here I cast some doubt upon the criticism. Widerker’s critique depends on the falsity of a view held by Molina (and others) about the possibility of non-deterministic grounds for “would-conditionals.” Apart from this point, there are plausible versions of libertarianism which avoid the thrust of Widerker’s criticism
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    Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.

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