Moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will: Reply to Van Inwagen

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220 (1998)
Abstract
In _The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 373-381, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book _The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principle the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,371
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1992). The Inevitable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):388 – 404.
Peter van Inwagen (1997). Fischer on Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373–381.
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

44 ( #38,832 of 1,102,850 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #24,605 of 1,102,850 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.