Morally responsible people without freedom

In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998)
In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions.
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