My way and life's highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry [Book Review]

Journal of Ethics 12 (2):167 - 189 (2008)
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the "ultimate perspective." In reply, I explore the nature of "zooming" arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned . Finally, I seek to address Perry's defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of "baggage"— even on his own account
Keywords Agency  Alternative possibilities  Baggage  Fatalism  Fundamentalism  General abilities  Molinism  Moral responsibility  Moral shallowness  Ockhamism  John Perry  Semicompatibilism  Saul Smilansky  Helen Steward  Ultimate perspective  Zooming in and out
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DOI 10.2307/40345348
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Thomas Nagel (1971). The Absurd. Journal of Philosophy 68 (20):716-727.

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