David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 111 (1):1-8 (1997)
A certain orthodoxy has it that understanding is essentially computational: that information about what a sentence means is something that may be generated by means of a derivational process from information about the significance of the sentences constituent parts and of the ways in which they are put together. And that it is therefore fruitful to study formal theories acceptable as compositional theories of meaning for natural languages: theories that deliver for each sentence of their object-language a theorem acceptable as statement of its meaning and derivable from axioms characterizing subsentential expressions and operations forming that sentence. This paper is to show that there is something deeply wrong with these ideas, namely that they are based on a certain confusion about ascriptions of semantic knowledge. The paper is to make this point by considering a semantic theorist who has explicit knowledge of a theory of truth for L. And by showing that all the theorist needs to have knowledge of to understand the sentences of L are these axioms -- that the derivation of T-theorems is epistemically redundant. And that this doesnt change when we turn from explicit to what has been called tacit knowledge.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark Textor (2001). Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
Wang Lu (2008). Theories of Meaning. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):83-98.
Jakub Szymanik (2010). Computational Complexity of Polyadic Lifts of Generalized Quantifiers in Natural Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (3):215-250.
Peter Pagin (2006). Meaning Holism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Jeff Speaks (2006). Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
Thomas Hofweber (2010). Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
Dean Pettit (2002). Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language. Mind 111 (443):519-550.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #76,845 of 1,098,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #175,054 of 1,098,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?