David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1998)
This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism.
|Keywords||Control Ethics History Moral Theory Responsibility|
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|Buy the book||$9.51 used (83% off) $33.99 new (39% off) $38.48 direct from Amazon (31% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1451.F57 1998|
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Michael Mckenna (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2012). What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Matthias Steup (2008). Doxastic Freedom. Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Matthias Steup (2012). Belief Control and Intentionality. Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
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