Responsibility and self-expression

Journal of Ethics 3 (4):277-297 (1999)
I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.
Keywords alternative possibilities  control  free will  moral responsibility  narrative  self-expression  weakness of will
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