Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom

Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):203 - 228 (2008)
In this paper I seek to identify different sorts of freedom putatively linked to moral responsibility; I then explore the relationship between such notions of freedom and the Consequence Argument, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-examples, on the other. I focus (in part) on a dilemma: if a compatibilist adopts a broadly speaking "conditional" understanding of freedom in reply to the Consequence Argument, such a theorist becomes vulnerable in a salient way to the Frankfurt-examples
Keywords Compatibilism  Conditional analysis of freedom  Consequence Argument  Harry G. Frankfurt  Frankfurt-examples  Freedom  Free will  Guidance control  Incompatibilism  Moral responsibility  Regulative control  T. M. Scanlon  R. Jay Wallace  Gary Watson
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DOI 10.2307/40345379
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Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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