The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control

Blackwell (1994)
The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion.
Keywords Causation  Determinism  Free Will  God  Morality  Personhood  Religion  Responsibility  Social Philosophy  Society
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Call number BJ1461.F49 1994
ISBN(s) 1557861552   9781557868572
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Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.

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