David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (3):531-556 (2009)
Control-based models of moral responsibility typically employ a notion of "tracing," according to which moral responsibility requires an exercise of control either immediately prior to the behavior in question or at some suitable point prior to the behavior. Responsibility, on this view, requires tracing back to control. But various philosophers, including Manuel Vargas and Angela Smith, have presented cases in which the plausibility of tracing is challenged. In this paper we discuss the examples and we argue that they do not in fact impugn an attractive and natural tracing component. Our discussion can function in part as a defense of a control-based account of moral responsibility, but also as simply a defense of tracing.
|Keywords||tracing moral responsibility Manuel Vargas Angela Smith|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
John Danaher (2016). Human Enhancement, Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):359-378.
Chandra Sripada (2016). Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
Alfred Mele (2011). Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.
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