The truth about tracing

Noûs 43 (3):531-556 (2009)
Abstract
Control-based models of moral responsibility typically employ a notion of "tracing," according to which moral responsibility requires an exercise of control either immediately prior to the behavior in question or at some suitable point prior to the behavior. Responsibility, on this view, requires tracing back to control. But various philosophers, including Manuel Vargas and Angela Smith, have presented cases in which the plausibility of tracing is challenged. In this paper we discuss the examples and we argue that they do not in fact impugn an attractive and natural tracing component. Our discussion can function in part as a defense of a control-based account of moral responsibility, but also as simply a defense of tracing.
Keywords tracing  moral responsibility  Manuel Vargas  Angela Smith
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Benjamin Matheson (2014). Escaping Heaven. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):197-206.
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