Utility theory with inexact preferences and degrees of preference

Synthese 21 (2):204 - 221 (1970)
a–b* c–d is taken to mean that your degree of preference for a over b is less than your degree of preference for c over d. Various properties of the strength-of-preference comparison relation * are examined along with properties of simple preferences defined from *. The investigation recognizes an individual's limited ability to make precise judgments. Several utility theorems relating a–b * c–d to u(a)–u(b) are included.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413546
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