Advice-giving and scoring-rule-based arguments for probabilism
| Abstract | Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT. | |||||||||
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Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Brad Armendt (1992). Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
David Christensen (2001). Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
Alan Hájek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.
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