A Concise Analysis of Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude

Popper [3] offers a qualitative definition of the relation “p q” = “p is (strictly) closer to the truth than (i.e., strictly more verisimilar than) q”, using the notions of truth (in the actual world) and classical logical consequence ( ), as follows.
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