Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism

Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174 (2012)
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Abstract

In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values”. This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences should obey the probability calculus.

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2012-02-07

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

References found in this work

Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Objective knowledge, an evolutionary approach.Karl R. Popper - 1976 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (1):72-73.
The accuracy of predictions.David Miller - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):159 - 191.
Salmon's vindication of induction.Ian Hacking - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (10):260-266.

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