Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):477-500 (1997)
|Abstract||We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The mathematical ideas presented here originated in investigations of so-called stable models in the semantics of logic programming.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James Cain & Zlatan Damnjanovic (1991). On the Weak Kleene Scheme in Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (4):1452-1468.
Paolo Crivelli (2004). Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge University Press.
Philip Kremer (2009). Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363 - 403.
Philip Kremer (2008). Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5).
Baudouin Dupret (2011). Practices of Truth: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry Into Arab Contexts. John Benjamins Pub. Co..
Rufus Duits (2007). On Tugendhat's Analysis of Heidegger's Concept of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):207 – 223.
Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Philippe Schlenker (2010). Super Liars. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):374-414.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #106,238 of 549,067 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,067 )
How can I increase my downloads?