David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):332 - 338 (2007)
By and large, we think (Strevens's ) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman ) of his article on the Quine-Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens ). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD
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Joe Morrison (2010). Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism? Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
Jacob Stegenga (2013). An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence. Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
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Michael Strevens (2006). The Bayesian Approach to the Philosophy of Science. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition. Macmillan Reference 495--502.
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